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HISTORIOGRAPHY
MARK  TUSHNET*
These  comments  address  some aspects  of a theme suggested  in
the second part of Professor Horwitz'  paper'  from the perspective
of one  who  is  not a  historian  of the  late eighteenth  century but
who,  as  a  student  of contemporary  constitutional  law,  is  a  con-
sumer  of discussions  about the era of the  framing. The  theme  is
the recurrent  attraction  of the concept of republicanism  as a way
to make sense of at least some aspects  of the Constitution.2 I want
to direct attention to three points concerning the concept of a re-
publican  tradition, which  add up  to  an  expression  of skepticism
about  the utility of the  concept. The  first point is  historical, and
the  others  involve  the contemporary  application  of assertedly  re-
publican  ideas.
The historical point is that, as Professor Horwitz suggests, giving
the republican  ideal its proper place  in the historiography  of the
Constitution is no small task. 3  The difficulty is that republicanism
can have two  quite distinct meanings. First, the term can refer to
the particular  group  of ideas that coalesced  in the late eighteenth
century, and which historians like  Pocock, Bailyn, Wood, and Ap-
pleby have retrieved  for us.4 Alternatively, the term can refer to a
tradition,  which  is different  from  a complex  of ideas that  can be
precisely identified  as being in existence  during  any particular pe-
riod. I suggest that traditions consist of the relations among com-
plexes of ideas.5  That is, at one point people characterize  their be-
*  Professor of Law,  Georgetown  University  Law Center. A.B., Harvard  University,  1967;
J.D. and  M.A.,  Yale University,  1971.
1. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional  Thought, 29 W.
& MARY  L. REV.  57 (1987).
2. Surprisingly  little  attention  has  been  afforded  to the  possibility that republicanism
might help  make  sense of the Reconstruction amendments  to the Constitution.
3. Horwitz, supra note  1.
4. See id. at 58 n.7.
5. This formulation  differs  in important ways  from my own  prior uses of the concept of
the  republican  tradition.  See,  e.g.,  Tushnet, Federalism and the Traditions of AmericanWILLIAM  AND  MARY  LAW  REVIEW
liefs-the  complex of ideas they hold-as  a coherent  whole. When
those  beliefs  become  a  tradition,  however,  the  coherence  of  the
whole  may dissolve.  Successors  orient  themselves  to the tradition
by  identifying  some  elements  in  their  predecessors'  thought  to
which they continue to adhere and disregarding or explaining away
other  elements  in  that thought  which  they  feel  compelled  to  re-
ject.'  Viewed  in this light, republicanism  as a tradition would con-
sist  of the  orientation that successive  generations  had toward the
historical complex  of ideas  now characterized  as the republicanism
of the late  eighteenth  century.
If that  is  so,  however,  whether  the  concept  of  republicanism
should  continue to be  invoked  in discussions  of constitutional  de-
velopment is unclear to me. It  seems that few people in any gener-
ation after the founding conceived  of themselves as having the req-
uisite  relation  to  republicanism.  That  is,  few  people  oriented
themselves  toward  the  body  of eighteenth-century  thought.  One
might  make  the  point  succinctly  by  noting  that the  historians  I
have  mentioned  had  to  retrieve  republicanism  by  refreshing  our
memories.
In recent constitutional  theorizing,  Frank Michelman character-
izes republicanism  as  a dissenting  or  minority tradition.7  Histori-
ans who  have tried to trace the descent of republicanism  have  in-
deed located it in the  artisan class of ante-bellum New  York," the
peasantry  of upland  Georgia  after the  Civil War,9  and most inge-
niously in the followers  of Huey Long and Father  Coughlin.1 0  Yet,
Political Theory, 19  GA.  L. REV.  981  (1985);  Tushnet, Book  Review,  100  HARV.  L. REV.  423
(1986).  Obviously,  I think that the present  formulation  is better than the  earlier ones.
6.  My reformulation  was provoked  in part  by my discomfort  with certain statements  in
public discourse  about the Judeo-Christian  tradition. I  had  thought that the Judeo-Chris-
tian  tradition  was  actually  a  Christian  tradition;  that  is,  only  Christians  can  describe  a
Judeo-Christian tradition  because they orient themselves to a set of ideas that includes ele-
ments that comprise  the essence  of Judaism. Conversely, Jews do not orient themselves to a
set of ideas that includes  elements  that comprise the  essence of Christianity.
7.  See  Michelman,  The  Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100  HARV.  L. REV. 4,  18  (1986).
8.  See S. WILENTZ,  CHANTS  DEMOCRATIC:  NEW  YORK  CITY  AND  THE RISE  OF  THE  AMERICAN
WORKING  CLASS,  1788-1850  (1984).
9.  See S. HAHN,  THE  ROOTS  OF  SOUTHERN  POPULISM;  YEOMAN  FARMERS  AND THE TRANSFOR-
MATION  OF  THE  GEORGIA  UPCOUNTRY,  1850-1890  (1983).
10.  See A. BRINKLEY,  VOICES OF  PROTEST- HUEY  LONG,  FATHER  COUGHLIN,  AND  THE GREAT
DEPRESSION  (1982).
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if my suggestion about the proper way to conceptualize republican-
ism  as  a tradition  is correct,  these efforts  are fundamentally  mis-
guided. Whatever linkages today's historians can find between  ele-
ments  of  late-eighteenth-century  republican  theory  and  the
concerns of artisans,  peasants,  and the like,  it  seems indisputable
that those people  did not orient themselves to the republican tra-
dition. Indeed, I suspect that in terms  of self-conception, most  of
the people  these historians  wrote about  thought of themselves  as
attempting to fulfill the promise of liberal or Protestant thought as
it was in the late eighteenth century."  The historiographical prob-
lem, then,  is to make  sense  of republicanism  as  a tradition.
This problem  is exacerbated  when one  considers that historians
have not attempted to locate traces  of republican thought  even in
majority traditions. Most notably, any systematic effort to develop
linkages  between  late-eighteenth-century  republicanism  and later
thought eventually  will conclude that republicanism  animated the
twentieth-century  Progressives and the New Deal at least as much
as it animated the artisans, peasants, and other dissenters. 2  When
the historians  do  the  necessary  work,  constitutional  lawyers  will
find the  concept  of republicanism  rather less illuminating  than it
now  appears to be. The  concept will  be  spread  so  broadly across
the spectrum of constitutional thought in the United States that it
will tell us  little about any particular topic.
The difficulty  may arise  because  constitutional lawyers  who re-
cently have been attracted to the idea of republicanism have failed
to  distinguish between  a  complex  of ideas,  elements  of which  are
held  by different  people  at different times,  and a  tradition. The
eighteenth-century  relublicans  and  their  contemporaries,  the
eighteenth-century  liberals, articulated numerous ideas, only some
of which remain  attractive. Identifying  ideas of people  in the past
which today seem  attractive,  and from. those  ideas constructing  a
body  of contemporary  thought,  is  quite  different from  that  con-
struction, itself attractive because it  is composed of only those ele-
ments  of past thought  that  are  attractive  today, with  some  pur-
11.  I take this to be  the essential  argument, often  obscured, however, in J.  DIGGINS,  THE
LOST  SOUL  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS  (1984).
12.  For example, I would think that the idealist liberalism of T.H. Green and John Dewey
could readily be  reinterpreted  as  republican.
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ported  historical  body  of  thought  such  as  eighteenth-century
republicanism.  I believe that republicanism as a tradition had rela-
tively few  adherents until its recent  rediscovery.
I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  the  elements  of  republican
thought that people have  recently found to be attractive are not in
fact attractive. Rather, whatever  is attractive about those elements
must be  defended in contemporary terms, and not as the legacy of
a valued tradition. In a sense, historians'  recent  rediscovery  of re-
publicanism has been appropriated by constitutional lawyers in the
same  way we  always  appropriate  historical  work,  by converting  it
into  a hagiographical  yearning for the restoration of what we have
lost. Concerned  that we  will be unable to  develop  cogent defenses
for  what  we  find  attractive  in  republican  thought,  we  re-present
this  thought  to  ourselves  as  valuable  because  "the  framers"
thought  it was valuable. 13
The  theory  that  eighteenth-century  republicanism  was  a  com-
plex  of ideas  suggests  another  dimension  of the  problem. 4  That
complex unravels  once  we attempt to disentangle  the currently at-
tractive  strands from  the currently  unattractive  ones.  We  are  left
with nothing that has any historical pedigree.  We  might consider,
therefore, two elements  of republicanism  that recent  constitution-
alists have  found attractive:  its concern  for a certain type of egali-
tarianism,  and its  reliance  on  concepts  of public virtue.
Eighteenth-century  republicans  were  egalitarians  of  a  certain
sort. They were  sure that a government  controlled  by people  who
were dependent  on others  for their livelihoods  would  become  cor-
rupt. This  dependency was troubling for several reasons.  If the de-
13.  The  Burkean  tradition  of conservative  thought  might  defend  aspects  of  republican
thought in this way, but such a defense  would not succeed here. Burkean  conservatism  de-
fends whatever arrangements  happen to have developed  in a society on the ground that they
are that society's traditions  and therefore must be valuable to it. Yet, if republicanism is not
in fact  a viable tradition, as I have  suggested, the Burkean defense  of the republican  revival
in constitutional  law is  unavailable.  This point indicates  one  of the most serious  problems
with Burkean  thought-its inability to account  for change  except  by stating that whatever
changes  occur  are those that  are appropriate  for  the  society. See,  e.g.,  C.B.  MACPHERSON,
BURKE  38-50,  71-74 (1980).
14.  The  rediscovery  of the republican  tradition  may allow  contemporary  liberals  to meet
proponents of the jurisprudence  of original intent on originalist grounds. By invoking repub-
licanism,  contemporary  liberals can contest the claim that originalism is linked  to conserva-
tive results.
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pendents followed the dictates of those upon whom they depended,
they  would  not inject  into  public  deliberations  the  disinterested
concern  for the  public  good that republicans  thought  essential.1"
Alternatively, they would be so  distracted from the public good by
the daily struggle to survive that they would attempt to utilize the
government  to  protect their  parochial  interests.  Their  superiors,
however,  in this view, were also unlikely to contribute to the public
good, because their characters  would be shaped by the experience
of having  people  dependent  on  them,  which  would  lead to  arro-
gance  and  the view that the social  order  existed  to promote  their
parochial  interests.16  The  eighteenth-century  republicans  had  a
straightforward solution to the problem  of dependency: restrict the
franchise  to those  who  were not dependent. Within the  restricted
franchise  equality  would  prevail;  outside  it,  inequality would  not
threaten  the republic.1
7
Contemporary  admirers  of  republicanism  obviously  do  not  de-
fend the reimposition of franchise restrictions that two centuries  of
struggle  have  eliminated. They believe instead that republicanism
can be revitalized  by establishing the independence  of all who are
currently enfranchised.  I, too, find that vision quite attractive. It  is
not really  a republican  vision,  however,  insofar as  it  is predicated
on an expansion  of the franchise  well beyond what the eighteenth-
century republicans thought appropriate.  Once again,  emphasizing
the  historical  definition  of  republicanism  draws  us  further  away
from it rather than allowing us to appropriate  it selectively for our
present  purposes.
15.  Voting  in the  open,  for example,  would  lead the dependents  to give  their  vote,  not
technically,  but in fact, to those on whom  they depended.
16.  The  republican  regard  for  independence  explains  why historians  have  been  able to
trace republican-like  concerns to artisans and peasants; these  were precisely the people who
had some of the  characteristics of an independent population  but were  feeling the pressures
of social change  that were  transforming them  into dependents.
17.  Eighteenth-century  republicans also had a solution to the potential instability created
by the resentment  of those  outside  the franchise.  The  solution  was  a culture  of deference
and patriarchy. This  solution, however,  is obviously and properly irretrievable  today. Joyce
Appleby has  cogently argued  that this irretrievability  resulted from  the  expansion  of the
capitalist market economy, which itself was defended  by republicans as valuable. J. APPLEBY,
CAPITALISM  AND  A  NEW  SOCIAL  ORDER: THE  REPUBLICAN  VISION  OF THE  1790s  (1984). To that
extent, then,  eighteenth-century  republicanism was not coherent as  a political economy.
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A second element  of republicanism  that recently has  become at-
tractive  is its concern  for public virtue. That concern seems to of-
fer an escape from the debilitating  effects of interest group compe-
tition on the political process.18 In place of selfish interest, concern
for  the  public  interest  would  prevail.  Michelman  has  suggested,
however, the  difficulty of recapturing  a sense of "the  public inter-
est"  once  we  have  abandoned  other  elements  of the  world  view
that constituted  eighteenth-century  republicanism. 9  For example,
republicanism's  competitor,  liberalism,  has  become  so  strong  that
reconstituting a public policy that was not neutral  among alterna-
tive visions of the good would be impossible.  The republican  state,
however, must reject neutrality in order to encourage the civic vir-
tue that is its  foundation.
Consider  in this connection the proposition that eighteenth-cen-
tury  republicans  regarded  organized  religion  as  an  essential  ele-
ment in the institutional arrangements  that supported civic virtue.
The  heirs  of the  eighteenth-century  republicanism  thus  are  the
supporters of the legislation at issue in Edwards v. Aguillard, 2" the
"equal time for creationism"  case. Pointing out the connection be-
tween civic virtue of the past and the present necessity  for the re-
publican  state to avoid neutrality  on matters critical to the devel-
opment  of  appropriate  character  in  the  citizenry  explains  why
many people are  concerned that the republican  tradition is neces-
sarily  authoritarian  and  for that reason unattractive.
Once again, however, this conclusion is not correct. Precisely  be-
cause republicanism  was a complex  of ideas that made sense  only
as a unit, we cannot select from it only one or two strands, nor can
we ignore it because  one or two strands are unattractive.  Unfortu-
nately,  neither  can  we  re-appropriate  it  as  a  unit, for  too  much
about eighteenth-century  republicanism  depended  for  its sense  on
a social setting in which religion meant Protestant Christianity, the
franchise was restricted, and other forms of unattractive exclusions
from participation in government prevailed.  This suggests to me a
quite  modest  conclusion:  that  the  rediscovery  of the  republican
18.  See, e.g.,  Sunstein,  Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38  STAN.  L. REv.  29
(1985).
19.  Michelman,  supra note  7,  at 21-23.
20.  107  S.  Ct. 2573  (1987).
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tradition can have for contemporary constitutionalists only the sig-
nificance  that  all historical  work  has  for  us.  It  shows us that  we
must  constitute  our  society  for  ourselves,  aware  of  but  neither
bound by  nor able to reproduce  the experiences  of the past.